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Abstract
This thesis explores the sociological underpinnings of generation by drawing on Mannheim’s
theory of generations and applying the concept as an explanative force in long-term societal
change. Individuals of the same cohort and national culture make for a generation location; they
share a similar parameter of experience within the stream of history. As individuals collectively
enter into the formative years of adolescence, significant Imprint Events can forge a bond
between them in terms of mindset and worldview (Habitus), which endure over the life course.
This group of individuals, as a result, develop a generational consciousness that is distinct from
other groups who had different generation locations and formative imprints. When that group
interacts with elements of their social order through the lens of their distinct generational
consciousness, they truly become a social generation. Social generations are not monolithic,
however, and separate generation units can emerge when individuals respond to the same
formative circumstances in different ways. Some generation units are so prominent or vocal that
their response, despite being one of many, is perceived as the perspective of the generation; these
units tend to define the legacy of that generation. Through actualizing their generational
consciousness in ways both intentional and unintentional, grand and minuscule, a generation acts
upon the social process, creating social change or maintaining the status quo. Younger
generations, because they are less socialized and routinized by the present configuration of
society, are more likely to drive social change. Because new generations emerge with their own
consciousness and create change in the image of that consciousness, the ceaseless process of
generation succession can be viewed as a driving force of history.
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Introduction

Mainstream conversations about generations have been common the past few decades, but such
conversations took an antagonistic turn the last few months of 2019 when the term “OK
Boomer” rose to prominence. Now, generational antagonism is nothing new. The bottled-up
contempt the young and the old hold for each other surely extends back as far as youth and old
age, but in Western civilization it finds documentation as far back as the days of Socrates.
Ancient Greek youth were scolded as the tyrants of the household, zealous in their defiance of
established filial expectations and offensive in their rebuke of basic social norms.1 That “kids
these days” mentality no doubt was joined by its converse: disdain for the out-of-touch geezers
by headstrong young guns. In our modern times, each specific generation has traversed the
gauntlet of lambasting offered up by others, especially throughout their youth. The Baby Boomer
generation (for the purposes of this paper, defined as those born between 1946-1964) were
scorned as immature, hapless hippie bums when they were coming up.2 Since then, many
Boomers have dealt the lashes to their own generation, defining themselves as self-centered
“hungry locusts” too foolish or too greedy to leave behind a prosperity better than or even
proportional to the one they inherited.3 Gen Xers (1965-1980) after them were vilified as the
sedimentary MTV Generation, a group of cynical slackers. Millennials (1981-1996) almost need
no introduction, for the image of overprotected, entitled trophy-kids comes to mind. They have
additionally been pegged as exceedingly selfish, garnering the alternative nickname of
Generation Me.4
The story of how the “OK Boomer” phrase inflamed generational tensions is intertwined
with the new generation following the Millennials: Gen Z (1997-2012). The springboard for the
1

phrase’s leap into the popular consciousness was the invocation by 25-year-old New Zealand
lawmaker, Chloe Swarbrick. She was commenting on a bill which would provide a pathway for
zero carbon emissions in her nation by 2050 when an older gentleman of the Parliament heckled
her.5 Swarbrick answered with that succinct, dismissive recognition of the cohort to which the
heckler presumably belonged. The words struck a chord with young Millennials—Swarbrick
herself belonged to this age-group—and Gen Z teens in America, becoming a social media
rallying cry against the old-fashioned sensibilities of older generations. Baby Boomers reacted to
the mock with varying degrees of support, disdain, and anger. One commentator declared it an
ageist slur comparable to a racial epithet.6 If the New York Times is to be believed, the insult’s
dominance among youth marked the “end of friendly generational relations.”7 That is an
overzealous interpretation of the situation. Still, while the phrase’s ubiquity is a testament to the
essence of satiric internet humor, its usage goes beyond a fleeting meme. It speaks to a general
air of discontent among young people with the world their forebears have left for them; it speaks
to a generation gap that is widening in the face of Gen Z’s expanded comprehension of the issues
they didn’t cause but must solve. Fittingly, the parliamentary bill Swarbrick was discussing
aimed to address the greatest of these issues: climate change.
The average Global Mean Surface Temperature of Planet Earth today is 1oC (1.8oF)
warmer than the pre-industrial (1850-1900) levels.8 As that single degree of warming has come
about, Arctic sea ice has shrunk,9 fire seasons have expanded and sea levels have risen.10 These
effects and their concomitant hazards to wildlife, ecosystems, and human communities are
locked in as the status quo now, for temperatures only continue to rise. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has determined 2010-2019 to be the hottest decade on
record, with eight of those years being among the ten hottest individual years on record.11 Behind
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2016, 2020 is the second hottest year on record.12 Carbon dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas which
serves to warm the planet, has been released into the atmosphere at an unnaturally high rate since
human industrialization. 33 Gigatonnes of CO2 were released into the atmosphere in 2019, tied
with 2018 for the year with the most human-caused energy-related carbon emissions.13 The
2021 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in addition to
unequivocally attributing climate change to human behavior, noted that “In 2019, atmospheric
CO2 concentrations were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years (high confidence).”14
The unabated continuation of these emissions and thus unabated warming will result in a world
with average temperatures north of 2oC above pre-industrial levels at the end of the 21st century.
The best-case goal is not even a reduction in warming or stabilizing it to 1oC above pre-industrial
levels—it is keeping warming to 1.5oC by 2100. The window for achieving that ideal level of
warming is rapidly closing. The IPCC released a seminal special report in 2018, declaring 2030
an essential deadline in the battle against climate change.15 That marks the year at which our
current carbon emissions should be nearly halved so that by midcentury, the sum of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions can be net zero. Failure to keep to these deadlines would
drastically reduce the likelihood that warming stays at or below 1.5oC by the end of the century.
It is clear, then, why young folk embraced a term that simultaneously poked fun at and
criticized their elders. It is clear why this youngest generation, comprised of individuals who are
growing up in the midst of the real consequences of climate change and also in the midst of
thorough scientific understanding of humanity’s impact on climate change, is frustrated with
previous generations who are passing along this crisis to them. It is clear why Gen Z, armed with
the knowledge of these pivotal deadlines, has been compelled to act.
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In March of 2019, more than a million young students around the world skipped school in
the name of a global climate strike.16 They were inspired by then-16-year-old Greta Thunberg,
the Swede who has become the leading voice for climate activists the world over but especially
among her fellow youth. She rose to prominence when she began to skip school each Friday to
protest outside her nation’s parliament building. She stirred up enough discussion to earn her
place at international summits, and the youth-led movement she became the face of rallied for
another historic protest in September 2019. Coined the Global Week for Future, a riff on the
Fridays for Future organization which sprouted from Greta’s initial protest, more than 6 million
activists participated by walking out of their schools or workplaces.17 In the United States
specifically, youth-based activism flourished. Gen Zers formed or led groups like U.S. Youth
Climate Strike, Zero Hour, Earth Guardians, Youth v Gov, 350.org, and more grassroots
initiatives. Perhaps the most prominent climate activist group is Sunrise Movement, which first
garnered recognition for their involvement in sit-ins of prominent lawmakers like Sen. Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-MD) and has since then been a
vocal advocate for the Green New Deal.
It seems evident then that climate change, as a source for heightened generational
tensions and the motivation of a renewed wave of youth activism, is essential to the Gen Z
experience. It is a circumstance which is molding Gen Z and as a result is now being affected by
Gen Z. What becomes of climate change over the remainder of the century—which boils down
to the extent to which warming can be subdued—will largely be dependent on how successful
Gen Z is in their advocacy for climate-conscious energy policies. The greatest impediment to this
advocacy is likely to be those of older generations who did not grow up in a world with such
clear understanding of climate change and the severity of its effects and who also will not bear
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the greatest of its consequences later down the line. The influence of and reactions to this
societal phenomenon seem to be connected to generations. Similarly, the fate of this societal
phenomenon also seems to be connected to how generations perceive and interact with it. Such
connections point to a potential way to better understand social phenomena: by evaluating their
relationship to the generations that exist during their occurrence and especially to the generation
which is coming-of-age during their occurrence. In other words, the concept of generations
might be used as an analytical tool to contextualize the forward march of history and the social
change which propels it.
Before a conversation can begin about whether Gen Z is a cohesive, identifiable unit (a
generation) that will influence society (through affecting climate policy, for instance), the
fundamentals of what generations are and how they function in terms of the larger social process
need to be addressed. This thesis aims to explore these fundamentals. The primary research
questions guiding this research are: (1) what is a generation? (2) how are distinct generational
identities formed? and (3) how does generation succession allow generations to serve as a social
force arising from and interacting with historical circumstances? The methodology I use to
explore these questions is an integrative literature review, which is defined as “a form of
research that reviews, critiques, and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an
integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated.”18 Various
generation theories, behavioral theories, and social cohesion theories will be touched on in the
following chapters. This thesis will focus on detailing the complexity of generations and
clarifying what practical use the concept holds for the modern world.
Ultimately, generations are a lens through which we can extend our understanding of the
social process—the unending evolution of human civilizations. A tool by which we can measure
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the hows and whys of history. A social force which, through the constant stream of old
generations dying off and new generations emerging, actually drives change in the social
process. These are the key contentions of generational theory. By the end of Part I, such varied
functions of this concept should be clear.
In Chapter 1, I chart the origins of our modern sociological understanding of the concept
of generations, building toward the man whose influential theory fathered a new school of
thought: Karl Mannheim. His specific perception of the constituent elements of a social
generation is foregrounded as the guiding framework for conceptualizing what a generation truly
is. Further, I introduce two major theories on how generations develop and function in society:
the pulse-rate theory and the Imprint Theory.
In Chapter 2, I examine how a generation forms a distinct identity—or generational
consciousness—in the Mannheimian tradition. By coalescing the wisdom and findings of a vast
array of generational researchers, the various sections of this chapter depict how historical,
cultural, and social influences can and do unite individuals into a common identity. Abstract
assertions on generations are given empirical weight by real-world examples and studies.
In Chapter 3, I delve into how generations endowed with their own distinct
consciousnesses drive social change through the process of generation succession. The
relationship between individual decision-making and societal shifts is made clear. I offer a key
explanation of how the social process imparts onto a generation a specific set of “native”
characteristics which influences their generational consciousness and how in turn that generation
“vanguards” unique change in the social process. Also, I offer a brief account of additional
generation theories that have helped to develop the concept, including Strauss and Howe’s wellknown cyclical theory.
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Author’s Note:

It is imperative to note some crucial distinctions about terminology regarding generations before
delving deeply into the many complicated theories that surround the subject. A principal
distinction needs to be made between genealogical—or kinship related—generations, and those
that pertain to social groups. In kinship terminology, genealogical generation refers to the
relational structure of familial members to each other; the parents make up one generation, their
batch of children make up a generation, and then their offspring make up another generation
within the familial line. While family can play a fundamental role in this paper’s proposed idea
of generational experience, kinship-based generations are not the focus here.
Another fuzzy distinction to make clear is that of “generation” and “cohort.” These terms
are similar, but “cohort” refers to a singular aspect of the concept of generation that I will work
from throughout this paper. Broadly, a cohort is simply a group of individuals who share some
defining characteristic. In demography, birth year is this defining characteristic, and it is that
characteristic I refer to when I use “cohort.” When people are born within the same general time
frame, they occupy the same cohort. An individual born in 1928 and an individual born in 1930
are of the same cohort, as is someone born in 1938 depending on where the demarcation lines are
drawn. They are not automatically, however, a part of the same social generation. Now, these
terms have become entangled because generational boundaries tend to inform where cohort
boundaries are drawn (for instance, the “Silent Generation” runs from 1928 to 1945, and so the
individual born in 1927 is seen as a different cohort despite the proximity to the person born in
1928). In reality, cohorts, and generations for that matter, are distinguished by gradients, not
stark dividing lines. But they are easier to conceptualize—and study—if we apply those dividing
lines.
8

So, cohorts are groups of individuals born with a select time frame. And they are a
necessary component of social generation, but only compose one piece to that complex puzzle.
The rest of this work is a venture in sorting out just what that puzzle entails.
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Chapter 1: Foundations of Social Generation

To begin with the thinkers who influenced Karl Mannheim in his eventual landmark theory
seems apt. Earliest among them were David Hume and Auguste Comte. As students of the
positivist school of thought, they sought to approach a social phenomenon like generations with
empirical science, relying only on concrete information ascertained by experience and explained
through reasoning. So, they tried to understand the “ultimate data” of human historical existence
via the biological tangibility—in the sense that life-spans, births and deaths, are quantifiable and
thus represent actually comprehensible knowledge—of generations.19
Hume, the Enlightenment philosopher, pondered over the connection that human
demographic metabolism, wherein older generations depart society and younger generations
enter it in an endless succession, has with the continuity of forms of government.20 Comte took it
further: he suggested that the continuous death and replacement of members of society
influences the tempo of historical progress. It is here that a cornerstone notion of Mannheim’s
vision of social generation emerged: that generations and social change are related. Viewing
generations as biologically determined, Comte wagered that lengthened or shortened life-spans
would have the intuitive impacts on the rapidity of societal change.21
This biological understanding of generations continued in the 19th century, and efforts
arose to uncover some fixed metric by which the rhythmic renewal of death—and by extension,
the rhythmic occurrence of historical events—could be measured. French philosopher Justin
Dromel posited a period of 15 years whereas his Italian contemporary Giuseppe Ferrari favored
30 years.22 Splicing age-groups into biologically-informed, regular intervals was deemed by
Hans Jaeger as the pulse-rate theory.23 Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset latched onto
the 15 year paradigm, wagering that it is the span of time in which the “tone of history” changes;
10

he identified 1626, the year Descartes turned 30, as the ‘pulse’ around which all generational
boundaries theretofore and thereafter would be drawn each 15 years.24 Most advocates of the
pulse-rate theory, however, championed a 30-year period of generations because conventional
wisdom of the day dictated that “during the first 30 years of life people are still learning, that
individual creativeness on an average begins only at that age, and that at 60 a man quits public
life.”25 An additional attempt to scientifically pinpoint the proper increments of generations that
one could use to understand historical processes came about from Gustav Rumelin, a 19th
century statistician. He took the sum of the average age of marriage among men and half of the
average period of marital fertility in order to find the length of generations in Germany and
France, which he found to be 36½ years and 34½ years, respectively; his findings ultimately
reject the notion that historical events rigidly correspond to regularly occurring intervals of
generation-periods because the factors which truly inform these generation-periods, average age
of marriage and number of children born to a mother as well as the timing of their births, are
variable.26 That is to say, there is no fixed interval by which generational spans repeat.
Rumelin was not alone in contesting the validity and applicability of the pulse-rate
hypothesis. Norman Ryder, a premier contributor to generational theory, also criticized many of
the assumptions contained within that hypothesis. He dismisses the notion that father-son
periodicity within the family can be transposed to society as a whole, for in any given year there
is some fairly consistent number of parents of a wide range of ages participating in the gradual
reproduction of the population.27 Peter Hart-Brinson, an incisive rising theorist in generational
studies, echoes this contempt, likening the pulse-rate theory to the alluring nonsense of
astrology.28 Historian Hans Jaeger characterizes the paradigm, particularly the idea that
Descartes is the focus point around which the fixed “pulse” of society is arranged, as grotesquely
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inept, without merit, and deserving of no further consideration.29 Still, despite their attempt to
discern some absolute rhythm to the march of history, the pulse-rate theorists initiated the crucial
conceptualization of generations as a measure of the social process.
As the explanatory potential for non-genealogical generations gained traction, an
adversarial school of thought emerged. In contrast to positioning generations as a quantitative
temporal unit specified by fixed intervals, an interior notion of time became the bedrock upon
which future researchers built their generational theories. Essentially, it is the same notion that
lends the following statement its truth: you are not a different person today than 5 years ago
because an absolute length of time elapsed, but because the varied experiences which speckled
that length of time influenced you into becoming your present version. The true measure of
change is not the external parameters of days, months, years or so on, but the circumstances
which color those parameters and culminate in our lived reality. Applied in a communal sense,
Jaeger traces this qualitative time—which is not projected onto the historical stream but is
“actually experienced by those who are embedded in its flow”30—back to Dilthey, who
speculated that some common experiential force bound together a collection of German
romantics who happened to be born within a couple of years of each other.31 This force:
historical circumstance. As Cavalli wrote, “Obviously, it makes a difference to be an adolescent
or a young man in time of war or peace, to enter the labour market in a phase of high
unemployment or full employment, or even to retire in a time of crisis in welfare provisions.
Individual biographies are...influenced and conditioned by the historical context.”32 Jaeger noted
that Dilthey’s distinction of quantitative and qualitative time not only allowed for more
encompassing analysis of social change, with the qualitative measure being able to stand-in for
otherwise arbitrary external parameters, but it also spawned an alternative hypothesis to the
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pulse-rate appraisal of generations. One which aims to capture the messy relationship between
the calendars of history and one’s own lifetime and posits social generation as the avenue in
which these calendars undergo “mutual phasing,” and impress themselves onto each other in
lasting ways.33 It is the Imprint Theory.
The Imprint Theory asserts "the absorption of formative impressions during adolescence
tends to transmit for life to a great number of individuals of the same age a fund of relatively
homogeneous philosophical, social, and cultural guidelines.”34 That is, individuals of similar age
who share in common certain critical life experiences—ranging from predominant economic
conditions to seismic shifts in global politics to momentous historical events—in their youth tend
to develop relatively similar perceptions of the world that contrast with individuals of a different
cohort who experienced a different set of conditions in their own youth. In this model,
generations are not created by arbitrarily dividing the populace into rigid, non-overlapping
segments but are inductively identified as responses to some pivotal stimuli in society.35 The
theory builds off two fundamental premises, the impressionable-years and age-stability
hypotheses, which state that fundamental worldviews formulate as an individual comes of age
and that these worldviews tend to persist over the life course once major life disruptions have
been accounted for, respectively. Duane F. Alwin and Jon A. Krosnick supported these
hypotheses in their research, finding that sociopolitical attitudes that strengthened in stability
over time tended to emerge in late adolescence.36 An array of other researchers, principally
spearheaded by eminent political psychologist David O. Sears, have extended and reinforced
understandings of these two hypotheses and their validity.37
Additionally, the Imprint Theory has ethological roots in Konrad Lorenz’s study of baby
birds. Lorenz found that geese hatchlings responded to any moving, sound-producing object even
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if it is not the mother, and that this attachment continued long after the chicks exited
developmental stages.38 He coined this irreversible learning experienced during formative years
“imprinting.” Early patrons of the generational Imprint Theory, including Dilthey and even
Mannheim, predated Lorenz’s discovery, so while they didn’t invoke that terminology, the
parallel is apparent. The Imprint Theory of generations categorically rejects the “lawlike rhythm”
of generations that pulse-rate purports, and it puts emphasis on the crucial imprinting experiences
of adolescence as the binding agent which organizes adolescents into a shared sociohistorical
disposition—a shared consciousness.39
The theoretical discourse around generations which budded in the 19th century
blossomed in the 20th, beginning with philosopher Francois Mentre in 1920 and earning
contributions from art historians like Wilhelm Pinder, literary historians like Julius Peterson, and
scholars from yet more disciplines.40 But the most influential of these deepened considerations of
generation arrived in Hungarian-German sociologist Karl Mannheim’s seminal thesis described
in his essay “The Problem of Generations.”41 The work articulated the sociological utility of the
concept of generations; he argued that yes, they are an analytical framework which can deepen
understandings of the continuity and change of history because they are also a social force
cultivated by and affecting societal change via the distinct nature of what Jane Pilcher, a
sociologist who delivered an eminent reinvigoration of Mannheim’s legacy on generations in her
1994 article, calls “generational consciousness.”42 Subscribing to the assumptions of the Imprint
Theory, Mannheim asserts that generational consciousnesses are formed during an individual’s
key developmental period, specifically the formative years of youth, which incline them to
certain behaviors and attitudes shared in common with other individuals who underwent similar
experiences in the same period. In this way, these individuals are grouped together in a common
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consciousness; like circumstances breeds like mindsets. The basis of Mannheim’s perspective on
generations is that they form from and feed into broad-scale social change, but he’s careful to not
oversimplify this complex process with vague assertions about what defines a generation and
how they operate in the social structure. The mere existence of a generation does not
automatically yield changes in society, and being born within the same stretch of the temporal
landscape does not automatically make for a generation. Further, for Mannheim, a generational
consciousness can only arise from a bona fide social generation, which can only form when a set
of requisite conditions are sufficiently fulfilled. Below, I share his generational theory by tracing
his three-pronged delineation of the dimensions which compose a social generation.

Anatomy of Mannheim’s Social Generation
The first of Mannheim’s three principal concepts related to social generation is
generation location, synonymous with current understandings of cohort. A cohort is any group
of individuals who share some characteristic in common, and for our purposes that characteristic
is similar birth years. Here, the biological component of earlier generational thinkers fits in. A
group of individuals who were born within a certain number of years of each other are similarly
situated within the historical stream, and thus they are limited to a particular parameter of
experiences. Mannheim has been criticized for the comparison,43 but he likens class positions to
generation location in order to showcase how one’s placement within the historical structure (or
social structure, for class) renders a relatively uniform field of circumstances that, in turn, breeds
characteristic “modes of behavior, feeling and thought.”44 While class mobility is a possibility, of
course, cohort mobility is not. He does not mean to say, however, that being born within the
same year means two people will act and think the same, but that the range of experiences which
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they might encounter (and which influence their perspectives) are the same. More recent
theorists have incorporated Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of Habitus into generational theory
lexicon: "A Habitus circumscribes a set of dispositions to act and an evaluation frame of
perception which are at once historical, social and individual.”45 In essence, it is the ingrained
method individuals have to understand and engage with their varied contexts; those of the same
generation location are primed to have similar Habitus, or at least the potential for it. We know
this intuitively. An American born in the antebellum period will have a vastly different range of
options available to them for recreation, occupation, entertainment, and a variety of other facets
of life than their great-great-grandchild born during World War II. The time in which someone is
born matters to the worldview they adopt, and they are likely to share much more in common
with their peer group than with those born a hundred years on either side of them.
Cultural and geographic regions play critical roles in the formation of a common
generation location, too. Mannheim offers the analogy that those born in Prussia in the year 1800
had very little historical and social circumstance in common with those in China in the same
year.46 They may belong to the same cohort if we are scrutinizing the global population at large,
but the particulars of the immediate society they belong to are incongruent. So while generation
location is dependent on biological factors like birth, two individuals must be embedded within
the same stretch of the historical stream and subject to the same cultural factors in order to
belong to the same generation location.47 To be clear, the “location” part of generation location
does not merely refer to being born within the borders of some specific nation. There must be a
genuine, ongoing connection with that national culture; if a Prussian family moved to the New
World shortly after the birth of their first son, he may be reared in the ethnic tradition of his
homeland, but he would no longer belong to the specific generation location his peers back home
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inhabit. Generation location, or cohort, is a necessary but insufficient condition of Mannheim’s
social generation.48
This strikes at the heart of another criterion for Mannheim’s social generation. Members
of the same generation location, by virtue of having the same “parameter of experience” and thus
an inborn range of appraising the world around them, have the potential to engage with some
historical, social, or cultural stimulus characterizing their milieu.49 But in order to progress
toward a social generation—in order for generation location to become a generation as an
actuality—the members of a generation location must move beyond the potential to be in
interaction with prevailing stimuli and actually be engaged in such an interaction. Employing an
analogy of young Prussian peasants and townspeople, Mannheim details that “individuals of the
same age, they were and are, however, only united as an actual generation in so far as they
participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period, and in
so far as they have an active or passive experience of the interactions of forces which made up
the new situation.”50 The war Napoleon brought acted as the social current which bonded these
individuals of different walks of life yet of the same generation location together into a singular
generation as an actuality. Their experience was significantly impacted by the historical event.
Here, Imprint Theory provides a useful insight into Mannheim’s social generation. To
give a relevant example applicable to today’s youth generation: say that member A and member
B were both born in the same year in America. One is born to a middle-class family, the other to
a wealthy one. Though stratified along class lines, they are nocked on the same thread in
history’s tapestry, and thus share a common parameter of experience. Slavery is not, for instance,
within that parameter. But the indelible ghost of slavery and its legacy in institutionalized racism
is a part of both members’ parameter of experience. Within the confines of these parameters, a
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potentiality to engage with the prevailing circumstances exists. Thus, it can be said that the two
members belong to the same generation location. Some highly significant event, such as a
massive economic downturn, acts as the crucial formative experience tethering these members to
the social process. Though the particulars of the downturn’s effects will differ due to any number
of factors, not least among them the wealth disparity, it is difficult to imagine that the scope of
the financial downturn did not in some way disrupt both the children’s lives. Whether through
direct recognition that dinner portions have grown scantier and job positions have changed and
that new clothes have to be hand-me-downs, or through the indirect sense that some worrisome
issue is afflicting the country because everyone and the media are talking about it, these
members are dragged into the outstanding social current. And, occurring within the
developmental years of these members, this event serves as a crystallizing agent—or Imprint
Event—which will fundamentally influence these members’ attitudes and perceptions regarding
money, frugality, capitalism, pragmatism, fairness, economic justice, and more for the remainder
of their lives. It can be said, then, that in this scenario the two members belong to a generation as
an actuality which is forming. And via other complex stimuli, some acting as imprints, the
generation will deepen and morph and evolve and shift as a distinct consciousness begins to
emerge, one which is by necessity disparate from those possessed by social generations of the
past and future and from those any other cohort could possibly produce. It is a grossly simplified
version of how generations are born, but summarizes well how Mannheim viewed social
generations as beyond biological determination.
It is critical to recognize, however, that generations are not all-encompassing. Imagine
that there is also a member C for the recession analogy. Born in the same year, raised up in the
same national identity and more or less the same cultural context. From this information, it is
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clear that member C is of the same generation location as their counterparts. But despite its
scope, say this recession never reached member C’s community with any real significance, or not
any that member C would take note of. The toll was not suffered firsthand. It was not a
household topic of discussion, and the family rarely turned on the news. Even in a passive sense,
the economic downturn did not stamp onto member C any meaningful implications for their
experience of the world around them. They are untouched by the Imprint Event, and so they do
not belong to the actual generation which members A and B have been grouped into. The
potential for those like member C to be of the same actual generation as their coevals is always
present by virtue of their exposure to the same historical circumstances, but without legitimate
engagement with and experience of those historical circumstances, they do not become carriers
and shapers of their peers’ emergent generational consciousness. They obviously would not
share in the generational consciousness of some other social generation, for they would not fulfill
the requisite condition of being of their generation location nor actual generation. Simply, they
would not belong to any social generation unless some other Imprint Event affects the whole
generation location and this time truly weaves them into that generation as an actuality.
Importantly, too, is recognition that generations are not monolithic either. As Mannheim
notes, the effects of a significant historical stimulus will not be the same for every member of a
generation location. This fact complicates, but does not negate, Mannheim’s generation as an
actuality. His conceptualization compensates for disparate responses to social and intellectual
currents via generation units, the third component to his conceptualization of social generation.
Generation units, situated within generations as an actuality, allow us to account for the fine and
sometimes polar contrasts between near-age individuals who have interacted with some
significant historical event. To carry on the analogy Mannheim offers: the stimulus of war
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fomented two separate worldviews in the youth, one that can be described as romanticconservative and one as liberal-rationalist.51 Because generation units represent a more specific
way of participating within the social process, the outlook of members within a common
generation unit are more alike than those of a different generation unit. However, the larger
context of the generation as an actuality reconciles these different generation units into a
collective historical experience that is distinct and unique from those of individuals belonging to
different generation locations (and by extension, different generations as actuality and generation
units which may have arisen from these separate generation locations as a result of the peculiar
circumstances which marked their youth). The intragenerational variation in their responses to
the factors pervading their parameter of experience may be stark at times, but it must be less
stark than intergenerational variations in generational consciousness which distinguish two
separate social generations.
Harkening back to the recession analogy: should Member A and Member B develop
intensely different political views on economics, adopt different behaviors of spending, place
different emphasis on the values of frugality and charity, and exercise different degrees of
pragmatism in their money handling, they would still be a part of the same social generation. A
collective experience emerged from the historical stimulus, after all. Just not a duplicate one. The
influence an imprint phenomenon has on a generation is uniformly significant, but the precise
perspectives each individual of that generation develops as a result do not necessarily have to be
the same. Member A and Member B would belong to two separate generation units operating
within one broader generational consciousness; a case of intra-generational variation. The
inclusion of generation units into Mannheim’s framework is a testament to the messy complexity
inherent in studying social change. While generalizations are necessary to permit any substantive
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analysis of broad social change, there needs to be recognition of the idiosyncratic experiences
which characterize personal biographies as well as the factors which comprise these unique
biographies. I will name these factors a little further down, but a key point is that not every
individual—or grouping of individuals—will neatly and entirely fit into their generation’s
consciousness. Generation units depict the specialized, varied versions of a historical
consciousness without negating the existence of a larger shared generational identity across
units.
It is unfortunate but inevitable that a singular, dominant generation unit goes on to
become the embodiment, or voice per se, of the whole generation. Their particular manifestation
of the generational consciousness becomes the “generational entelechy,” or the fingerprint by
which a social generation is known.52 In this way, we can see that certain units of a social
generation, when they are tightly related to each other and deeply engaged with their
contemporary circumstances, are the agents of change which classify generations as a genuine
social force. Think of the WWII Generation; the entire cohort of individuals born in the
inaugural decades of the 20th century were defined by the valiant efforts of Americans fueling
the war effort at home and fighting it abroad. There were other responses to the dominant
circumstance of their time, of course, ranging from general apathy to conscientious objection to
suffering endured within unconstitutional internment camps.53 Or think of Baby Boomers, a large
and so obviously varied actual generation whose consciousness has largely come to be
remembered as the manifestation represented by student anti-war protesters of the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Generation units sometimes stand in for the whole of the social generation when
their iteration of the overall generational consciousness guides them in seeding actual change in
society.
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Chapter 2: A Deeper Look at Generational Consciousness

Social change can be understood through the lens of generation succession, wherein different
generations form distinct consciousnesses as a result of the prevailing historical and sociocultural
factors that dominate their developmental years that then in turn motivate a common field of
resultant behaviors, attitudes, perspectives, values, and overall mindset that each generation uses
in their unique interaction with the social process. In this way, Mannheim himself follows in the
tradition of Comte and Hume in reducing the “secret of history” to some identifiable process of
generational change.54 If there were no cultural difference between cohorts, the replacement
between them would merely be social reproduction.55 The replacement of generations, and the
arising tension between contemporaneous generations equipped with their own identities and
characteristics, is for these thinkers the invisible hand which incrementally transforms society.
The younger generations—comprised of “new organisms” capable of “new impulses”—push
back against the traditions of old which are incompatible with the emergent consciousness they
have formed.56 This succession of distinct generational consciousnesses constitutes Mannheim’s
theoretical grounds for considering generations a useful sociological tool for measuring the
progression of civilization. It becomes necessary, then, for us to comprehend how these changeguiding, distinct generational consciousnesses arise before we make claims regarding the routes
and types of changes they produce within society.
In the Mannheimian tradition, modern conceptualizations of generation are nearly
invariably linked with the Imprint Theory. Since his proposition of social generations, scholars
have aimed to determine the empirical validity and applicability of the ideas central to Imprint
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Theory and, by extension, the notion of generational consciousness. Much of their research has
indeed deepened understanding of how a generational consciousness develops in practice while
exploring and acknowledging the flaws baked into studying such a complicated subject. The
following sections depict their contributions, and we start with the researchers who expounded
upon the most immediately evident formative feature linking generational members into a
collective experience: dramatic historical events.

The Imprinting Power of History
One of the greatest studies in support of Mannheim’s generational Imprint Theory of
comes in Howard Schuman and Jacqueline Scott’s 1989 piece titled “Generations and Collective
Memory.”57 These sociologists sought to test Mannheim’s assertion that worldview-defining
events occur during adolescent years by conducting a national survey of the most important
events within a 50-year (1935 to 1985) period of history. They discovered that for “events and
changes… [that] Americans recall as especially important, the memories refer back
disproportionately to a time when respondents were in early teens or 20s.”58 For instance,
respondents who were young during WWII were more likely to cite that event as exceptionally
important within the given time period whereas those who were young during the Vietnam War
cited that conflict as most important. The authors are careful to note that, for the younger
respondents, this might be due to general apathy toward events which transpired before their
lifetime. But even still, Schuman and Scott wager that adolescence is the era in one’s life course
wherein generational imprinting will take place, as evidenced by these age-structured collective
memories. Even for respondents who chose events that did not occur within their youth, they
framed such events in contrast with whatever the prevailing circumstances affecting them in their
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youth were. For instance, those who came of age during the Vietnam War yet selected WWII
directly cited the “goodness” of the latter conflict—in contrast with the more obvious horrors and
pointlessness of involvement in Vietnam—as their reasoning. Their perception was still filtered
through the lens of the actual Imprint Events of their youth, then. In this way, the research
substantiated the chief postulates of Imprint Theory: the impressionable-years hypothesis and the
age-stability hypothesis.
A subsequent study by Larry J. Griffin extended Schuman and Scott’s research by honing
in on how region and race affects recollection of historical events.59 Affirming Schuman and
Scott’s findings in his unfalsified hypothesis that Southern whites will place more historical
significance on civil rights if they lived through it as an adolescent than other Southern whites
belonging to age groups who did not, Griffin also found that Southern whites who lived through
the civil rights movement gave it more weight than their non-Southern co-evals. That is to say, a
white Georgian who was 17 during the peak of the movement would think back on it with more
significance than a white Alaskan of the same age; the collective civil rights memory of
Southerners is generally greater than that of non-Southerners. Additionally, and unsurprisingly,
black respondents to Schuman and Scott’s 1985 survey as well as to the 1993 General Social
Survey recalled civil rights as the most important event much more readily than they recalled
other significant happenings of the 20th century.60 Griffin’s research confirms Mannheim’s
caveat about generation units within a social generation: additional factors like region and race
play a role in how someone recollects or perceives their historical location. Collective memory, a
method of understanding how Imprint Events sear themselves onto individuals in a common but
not homogenous way, is structured by adolescence as well as locus, or race, or gender, or
religion, or other identity markers. Ultimately, this insight lends credibility to the concept of
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generation unit rather than impugning the durability of the concept of social generation, for the
regional variations of civil rights memory are neither excessive nor stark enough to interfere with
the common, broader national culture that is a necessary element of the formation of any
generational consciousness.
These two sources affirm generational effects, those which result from the difference
between distinct generational identities, as explanations for the differences observed in the
collective memories of these individuals, but their studies point to another possible explanation
which often serves as a more definitive explanation: period effect. Complicating studies of
generational identity, period effects are any predominant influences existing at the time of data
collection which affects an individual’s worldview.61 Scott and Schuman contextualizes the
period effects in their assertion that if their 1985 survey were taken in 1950, almost every
individual in every cohort would point to WWII as the most important event because it would be
fresh in their memory. Griffin’s 1993 survey validates this view, for two years after the fall of
the USSR, the “end of communism” ranked as the most important event.62 If the same survey
were taken today, based on the findings of collective memory in the studies, one can reasonably
suggest that the end of communism would not be the highest ranked across all cohorts, but would
likely rank highest among the cohort which experienced that event during their adolescence. To
give another example: a survey in 2002 would likely show across all cohorts that 9/11 was the
most important historical event of the past 50 years, whereas nearly 20 years later the ranking of
that event might begin to structure by age, with responses peaking around those who lived
through it and the fallout during developmental years.
Further complicating the relationship between fine variations in historical circumstance
and the generational consciousness, Duane F. Alwin examined change and continuity in parent
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socialization across cohorts in Detroit.63 While leaning more toward genealogical generation, the
study is still applicable if we assume that families are an important part of a youth’s socialization
to the larger societal structure and historical context in which they have been born, which they
are.64 Reflecting Griffin’s piece, Alwin found that there was identifiable change in secular
methods of parents’ socialization of their children among different Catholic cohorts while there
was little change found among non-Catholic households.65 Though it supports Imprint Theory’s
assertion that values or attitudes formed during youth tend to endure over a lifetime, this study
verifies the nuance of social generations which is easily visible in generation units partitioned by
factors like “political and religious ideology.66 It bears repeating that generations are not
monolithic and generational effects are not the sole influence on the way in which an individual
interprets and moves through the world. Their personal Habitus is an intersection of many factors
which include religion, race, politics, region, sex, gender, class, and generation. This lattermost
identity, though, is inextricably linked with the development of the social process; so while there
are undoubtedly instances where the ‘consciousness’ granted by these other identities supersede
the influence of generational consciousness (e.g., someone’s race will better inform how they
view and experience a racist incident more than their generation), it is through understanding
how distinct generational identities form and function that we can more clearly see how history
beats on in the stream of time in the particular way it does.
Still more researchers hold to the validity of the Imprint Theory as the crystallizing
impetus for an overarching generational consciousness which satisfies Mannheim’s notion of
social generation, generation units included. Applying these theories to the Estonian cohort that
was in their formative years when the USSR collapsed, ringing in truly “exceptional” social
change, Raili Nugin provided an example of an imprint ushering a generation location into a
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generation as an actuality equipped with their own burgeoning collective consciousness.67
Crosby, Gill, and Lee determined that life-status variables such as marriage and retirement did
not account for all the differences in values for the consumers they studied, pointing to “cohorthistorical” reasons as the explanation for the remaining differences between those of different
age-groups.68 Strauss and Howe, premier researchers in the generational field, incorporate a
rough version of the Imprint Theory into their generation concepts. In their suggestion that
certain types of regularly recurring events create a correlating consciousness in the emerging
cohort, they affirm the power Imprint Events can have in thrusting a group of similarly-aged
individuals into a social generation defined by a particular, resulting generational
consciousness.69 A more detailed account of their influential generational theory comes in
Chapter 3, but the takeaway for now is that they too see Imprint Events as an integral component
of a generation’s collective Habitus.
Pointing to WWI and WWII, researchers have pinpointed the pronounced effects these
major imprint-level events had on the formation of the generational identity of the coming-of-age
cohort.70 World War II was a significant enough event that the generational names gifted to the
individuals who reached adulthood in the face of the conflict, from G.I. Generation to the
Greatest Generation to the World War II Generation, derive directly from the momentous
event.71 This formative event helped to organize members of a specific cohort into members of
an actual generation defined by a shared experience and consequently a shared worldview
relative to other cohorts. In 2016, Lauren M. Troska agreed that generations endure certain major
events that define distinct cultures, forming a gap in understanding between generations.72
Again, imprints coalesce individuals into a broader generational consciousness distinct from
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those of generations prior and subsequent, but Imprint Theory does not dictate that all behaviors
and attitudes and values must be the same because of it.
But, for good reason, there are concerns about the strength of Imprint Theory’s
determination of historical events as the sufficient factor in crystallizing a shared Habitus within
a cohort. A step up from the biological perceptions of generation, to be sure, yet not a complete
appraisal of how generations can be understood as distinct identities produced by the social
process. Chris Gilleard gives voice to these concerns in 2004:
If the advocates of generation are to advance their case, defining the nature of
generational identities and the means by which they are structured requires a new
approach beyond that offered by the ‘critical event’ approach. Cultural identities may
well incorporate historical events in defining a shared history – as Anderson (1983) has
noted in his account of the imagined community of the nation – but such signifiers are
typically established retrospectively and their relationship to present social realities is
iconic rather than experientially formative as students of political generations would
claim.73
The recognition that events reach imprint status, or at least are considered major enough to be
generation-defining, through a retrospective lens is echoed by Cavalli in the same year, 2004.
The qualities which characterize an event as critical and capable of imprinting can only be
arrested after the event via socio-historical research.74 Cavalli, however, offers a framework for
how we might judge a historical event’s ‘imprinting’ potential via the psychological process of
cognition development.
Joining the consensus that highly-receptive formative years occur between late childhood
and early adulthood, Cavalli wagers that a critical event triggers a similar learning process within

28

various members of a generation location. This shared learning comes if the critical event
satisfies each of the following: “(1) if it overcomes the threshold of the subject’s selective
perception and attention; (2) if it is somehow dissonant with the mental organization of
information and therefore produces a sort of ‘surprise effect’; (3) if it causes a restructuring of
the subject’s cognitive maps, of his/her orientation systems and images of the world.”75 Imprint
Events, he suggests, are fundamental breaks in the normal continuity of societal stasis. Crises,
such as war or presidential assassinations or massive terrorist attacks, satisfy this framework.
Advancements, such as space exploration and the internet, also seem to do so but to a more
subdued degree. Some truly severe, significant events are immediately recognizable as imprints,
for there is no doubt in the moment the news spreads that they are striking enough to demand
attention, dissonant enough to shock, and disruptive enough to necessitate a reordering of one’s
worldview. Some are not. Regardless, the relevance of historical Imprint Events to the formation
of generational consciousness is well-supported, even and especially because of retrospective
analysis.
Additional researchers have carried this notion further, examining beyond just the event
itself to reveal how the discourse around the event socializes individuals in their formative years,
thereby contributing to a shared Habitus. In looking at how adolescents’ predisposed attitudes
were changed or crystallized during communication around particular presidential elections,
Valentino and Sears make the case that political socialization gains did occur.76 That is, whether
or not adolescents actively enmeshed themselves in political discussions or received secondhand
barrages of political rhetoric centered on the prevailing issues of the day, they entered into the
social currents of the moment and inched closer to developing a unique consciousness informed
by those currents.77
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Culture and Consciousness
Peter Urwin and Emma Parry capture the turn in recent decades to consider a
generation’s unique Habitus development in terms of cultural phenomenon as well as historical
events, primarily because these phenomena can generate cultural markers that clarify and fortify
the collective persona a generation builds in the formative years of youth.78 Leading the charge,
and offering the most direct application of Imprint Theory to the cultural landscape, are Morris
B. Holbrook and Robert M. Schindler.79 In 1989, their survey discovered that popular music
tastes across various cohorts clustered in their respective late adolescence, early adulthood
years.80 They replicated their research with film stars as the cultural variable and found again that
there was an “age-related preference peak” for Hollywood figures that were prominent during
developmental years.81 Drawing on Lorenz as a possible explanation for certain stimuli
impressing onto individuals longstanding inclinations during biologically determined “sensitivetimes” of youth, they suggest that solidification tends to come at the upper threshold of youth for
music and the lower threshold of youth for film.82 The authors also consider the social dimension
of this cultural imprinting; through incessant repeat exposure which breeds significant familiarity
and thus favorability with a certain stylistic texture of an era of music and a correlation of ritesof-passage like prom or fond memory-making activities like backyard get-togethers with that
music, social settings compound and crystallize the cultural preferences of an individual to be
more like that of those within their same parameter of experience.83 In this way, we can see how
a common generational identity develops from the consistent imprinting of cultural phenomenon.
Sociologists Ron Eyerman and Bryan S. Turner suggest that these “shared rituals” of culture are
key in sustaining a generation’s collective memory of their distinct origins and identity.84 Huan
Chen affirms external Imprint Events as one of the core components of generational identity
while also touching upon the cultural function of marketing to construct, reflect, and cement
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generation identity; symbolization and other identity cues which target beyond just life stage
(e.g., youth, retirement, parenthood) activate an individual’s recognition and self-categorization
process, allowing them to determine whether or not the advertisement is pining for their
generation and by extension them, which ultimately helps to reinforce that generational
identity.85 It is not a stretch to suggest that generations become mini-cultures of their own, or
subcultures of the larger national culture, characterized by practices and attitudes that inform the
personal experience of those belonging to it. Historical imprints coalesce a cohort into a social
generation, and cultural markers scaffold and reinforce the common identity that emerges around
their unique generational consciousness.
These aforementioned scholars are not alone in affirming the importance of cultural
practices in maintaining a cohesive generational consciousness. Michael Corsten posits that it is
not enough for historical events to happen to a specific age-group to reasonably consider them
bound together in a genuine identity.86 Members of that age-group must possess and
communicate an established, collective criteria for interpreting and articulating their historical
context; Corsten considers “cultural circles” as the environments where people observe and
realize that others, even strangers, share their same Habitus.87 Beyond the superficial signifier of
the age—and thus cohort and generation—someone appears to be, cultural elements like the era
of music someone prefers to listen to or the pop culture references they make can clue others in
to whether someone is of their “in-group” generation or of an “out-group.” Even quirks in
someone’s patterned ways of speaking can display their cultural repertoire and allow others who
share in that repertoire more thoroughly identify with them. Slang terminology is a
straightforward example of this. There is an immediate understanding of where someone falls on
the generational map when they say “I’m gonna split” versus “gotta blast,” or “word from the
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bird” versus “no cap,” or “classy chassis” versus “dumb thicc,” or “main squeeze” versus “bae,”
or “bust a gut” versus “I’m dead,” or “groovy” versus “lit,” or “never trust anyone over thirty,”
versus “OK, Boomer.”88 It is interactions, then, between individuals that showcase their
parameter of experience and parameter of interpretation criteria, allowing individuals to mark the
boundaries between those who share comparable standpoints and those who do less so.89 The
cultural identity and overall consciousness of a generation becomes more solidified as a result.
Chris Gilleard is not fully convinced by Corsten’s cultural circles, taking issue with the
unclear means by which these informal discourse practices are formed and therefore the unclear
means by which they solidify generational distinctions.90 Gilleard does not declare the
impossibility of demarcating distinct generational Habitus, though. He reframes generation as a
“cultural field” in which all social participants no matter the age engage with at varying degrees,
but only a certain amount do so in a way which can be considered stylistic of their experience.91
He offers youth culture of the 50s as emblematic of his idea: “the worlds of commercial art and
design, the retail fashion industry, the media, and the entertainment industry” which expanded in
that era and were woven into the experiences of all cohorts created a particular field of cultural
markers by which adolescents in particular could define themselves. Fixated in their collective
memory, such cultural makers serve to bind a pool of adolescents together in an enduring fashion
even as they age. A common generational identity is fortified, then. McMullin, Comeau, and
Jovic note technology as another essential cultural marker, and even characterizes key advances
in computers as symbolic historical imprints.92 The progression of primary entertainment
mediums during one’s youth also serves as a key wedge in cultural gap between generations. The
radio subsided to black-and-white television with only three main channels before becoming
colorized and expanding with cable networks, which is now subsiding to the internet-enabled
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video on demand system which characterizes the streaming wars between Netflix, Hulu, HBO
Max, Disney+, Amazon Prime Video, Apple TV+, Peacock, and Paramount+. The childhooddefining cartoons featured on these devices have changed too, from black and white Looney
Tunes and Merrie Melodies to The Jetsons and The Flintstones to The Smurfs and DuckTales to
Animaniacs and Rocko’s Modern Life to Spongebob Squarepants and Phineas and Ferb to
Adventure Time and Regular Show. These cultural elements do not make as obvious or direct an
imprint on a generation’s consciousness as a critical historical event might, but they nonetheless
aid a social generation in developing a unique character.
It should also be noted that generational identities are maintained, strengthened, and
otherwise impacted by generational discourse in popular media and academic research alike. The
entire second Part of this work and all the studies discussed therein are prime examples of how
the cultural dimension of a generational consciousness can be influenced by our perceptions of it.
When the narrative is that Millennials are entitled, for example, Baby Boomers are able to
recontextualize their consciousness—from which this characteristic of entitlement is already
absent—to foreground and reinforce their attitudes on hard work and determination. They see a
negative attribute associated with some other generation and lean into their categorization as a
member of a different generational identity with its own distinct traits and values, thereby
furthering the actual connection of that identity. Meanwhile, Millennials implicitly buy into this
characterization of their generation when they situate themselves, individually, as the exception
to it; believing they are not like other Millennials in a particular respect reinforces that there does
exist some larger Millennial identity. This interplay between discourse on generations and the
clarity of a common generational identity details well how a generational consciousness is
distinguished constantly through cultural dynamics.
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Sociologist and author Nancy Whittier presents an understanding of how generational
identities are developed and reinforced: social action. With her notion of political generations,
Whittier extrapolates parts of Imprint Theory to showcase how a group of individuals who
“come of political age” together by joining a social movement—in her study, the feminist
movement—during the same wave form a common identity with each other.93 In her view, the
configuration of cultural circumstances of society at large as well as the social movement at the
time a twenty-something and seventy-something join will impress upon them both a shared
political outlook which will tend to endure as the social movement transforms in subsequent
waves. She discovered that manifestations of what it meant to be a feminist—including less
emphasis on structure and criticism of the racial and class homogeneity of earlier waves—
changed but the core collective identity forged at the time of entrance into the social movement
remained stable over time.94 When members of the same social generation enter into some
activist movement at around the same time, thereby becoming members of a particular political
generation as well, their shared identity becomes more layered while their shared consciousness
becomes more crystallized.
Echoing this view, Eyerman and Turner see social movements as prime opportunities for
"The marks of generational distinction [to be] realized.”95 They provide Baby Boomers as a case
study for how all the intersecting factors previously discussed clash and entangle to crystallize a
shared, collective, solidaristic generational consciousness. First, they note the unique historical
circumstances coloring Boomers’ parameter of experience: post-WWII industrialism, “rapid
population growth, economic expansion and a growing optimism in spite of the nuclear threat,”
and the Vietnam war as the foremost Imprint Event.96 Next, they describe how participation in
cultural rituals of electric rock, diverse folk music, clothing, American New Hollywood, sexual
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liberation, and mass media connected Boomers into a distinct, if emerging, Habitus. Finally, they
posit that key social movements in the 1960s and ‘70s including second-wave feminism and gay
liberation but chiefly peace protests and student movements acted as spaces to manifest the
Boomer consciousness, helping to at once define it and magnify it.97 Thus the cohort of Baby
Boomers, moored together by temporal happenstance, morphed into a unique generational
identity as a result of interacting with and influencing the social process.
Their story of generational consciousness captures how historical imprints crystallize it,
cultural phenomena sustain it, and social action manifests it.
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Chapter 3: Generation as a social force, generation succession as social change

With this greater understanding of how generations, and their unique identities are formed via
sociocultural and historical means, we can take a deeper look into their relationship with the
social process and how they act as reflections and drivers of social change. We know that
demographic metabolism, or the biological process for a population’s renewal through fertility
and culling through mortality, yields the possibility for social change.98 And, as Hart-Brinson
contends, the lack of idiosyncratic historical or cultural experiences would ultimately render this
process of personnel replacement as mere social reproduction.99 Thus, cohort replacement theory
only serves as a groundwork for our evaluation of the social process. Generation succession,
which can be described as the gradual development and death of inimitable generational
consciousnesses, undoubtedly injects variation into society. But how do these variations amount
to significant transformation within the social order? How do like circumstances beget like
pathways for change-making that affect these circumstances? These questions are not easily
answered. Important to unveiling how generations tend to act as social forces within society—as
Mannheim and his followers believe—is first addressing how scholars understand the ways in
which individuals tend to do so. For that, we turn to the relationship between values and
behaviors.

Values, Decisions, and Consequences
Drawing on Milton Rokeach, a seminal contributor to axiology and architect of a wellknown values scale, a value can be defined as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to alternate modes of
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conduct or end-states of existence.”100 It is immediately apparent in this definition how core
values—self-respect, social recognition, and mature love to name a few terminal values for a
preferred end-state of existence, and broadmindedness, responsibility, and sincerity as
instrumental values for a preferred mode of conduct—reasonably guide a person’s actions once
those values are internalized.101 Despite frequent contradictions within human nature, someone
who values mature love likely will not engage in superficial one-night stands every other day of
the week; someone who values responsibility will likely, whether consciously or unconsciously,
be careful about making it to obligations on time and prepared. The examples could go on.
Values that we place particular emphasis on or are otherwise central to our lives tend to produce
actions in alignment with those values. Dewey details in biting clarity how relevant actions are to
value systems: “As far as valuation and the theory of values are concerned, any theory which
isolates valuation of ends from appraisal of means equates the spoiled child and the irresponsible
adult to the mature and sane person.”102
Hitlin and Piliavin complicate Rokeach’s notion of values in their thorough deep dive
into the history of the sociological application of the concept, delivering a useful distillation of
values from related but dissimilar terms.103 Traits are “fixed aspects of personality” which
contribute to behavior but do not determine it, and often do not serve as the justification or
judgement framework for behaviors.104 For instance, someone with an aggressive disposition
who acts in alignment with the value of politeness and/or self-control has demonstrated greater
cognitive agency and should be commended accordingly whereas someone with a friendly
disposition who does not act in alignment with such a peaceable value represents the converse.105
Attitudes, or evaluations on whether an object or action is favorable or unfavorable, are often
conflated with values; the differentiation comes in values relating to central issues of personhood
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and cherished ideals. Sociologist Norval D. Glenn highlights the distinction: the statement
“personal freedom is good” points to a value whereas the statement “this law, which expands
personal freedom, is good” points to an attitude which derives from that abstract value as well a
perception of the law’s intended effects.106 To give another example, we can harken back to the
value of mature love. Premarital sex is not a value someone will have, but they might harbor an
attitude on it which is informed by their valuation of mature love, which in turn influences their
acceptable set of behaviors and ultimate mode of conduct. If one’s value of mature love
manifests in a favorable attitude toward physical intimacy in romantic relationships and thus a
favorable attitude toward premarital sex, then that behavior falls within the accepted parameters
of action and thus becomes likelier than the alternative; we can see how values serve as an
indirect but ultimate source for behavior. There is nuance in the interpretation of values,
however, which becomes visible through an individual’s attitudes on certain behaviors. Mature
love may be considered by some to mean withholding sexual intimacy until marriage, and so the
attitude they hold toward sex in premarital relationships as well as their actions in such
relationships will reflect this particular valuation. Attitudes are the signposts which reveal the
larger values behind the curtain.
Needs, Hitlin and Piliavin assert, are biological inclinations that are often reconstituted as
values; we can trace the value of mature love back to the biological need for reproduction, but
values remain the chief social factor affecting the final behavior in that extended example.107 A
fairly robust catalog of researchers have, in fact, correlated specific values with certain
behaviors.108 However, normative pressures of particular social situations are responsible for
shifts in behavior that may be contradictory to values.109 Despite being trans-situational, values
may be overwhelmed by the norms embedded within some social contexts so that behavior is
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driven primarily by an understanding for how one ought to act rather than their ideal course of
action. Thus, values compete and compound with norms, traits, attitudes, and even other values
to motivate action. Values central to the self, when well-articulated and energized, privilege a
narrow set of actions in which behavior is congruent with those values and thus override any
competing impulses.110 Life, of course, is rarely so simple. But the complex web of values and
their offspring chart the paths we take in the course of life.
This newfound understanding of values yields useful insight into how individuals act, but
how can we apply these notions on a societal scale? The pioneering work of Geert Hofstede,
initially in examining the differences between IBM employees of more than 50 countries and
since then in his expansion of data collection and revitalization of his analysis paradigms, gives
us a clue.111 He identified six dimensions of culture—originally the Power Distance Index,
Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, and Uncertainty Avoidance
Index, and later Long-term versus Short-term Orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint were
added—which serve to differentiate the value systems, or “software of the mind,” of workers of
different nations.112 For our purposes, Hofstede’s work is critical in revealing how the presence,
prominence, and prioritization of certain values within a society are reflections of the actions of
societal members who operate from these national values.
Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart offer another way values exercised on an
individual scale can have implications on a societal one.113 Their perspective is founded upon
evolutionary principles wherein human societies operate under the same imperative to adapt to
their environmental conditions; because humans have agency, societal evolution occurs far more
quickly than biological evolution and extends beyond the aim of surviving to that of thriving.
They outline how this societal evolution ripples up from individual actions:
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But the imperatives of adaptation operate also on the micro level of individual human
beings. Their capacities to exert agency enable them to make choices about what to
maximize in their lives. Because these choices are not fully predetermined, they differ.
Differences manifest variation in human maximization strategies. Variation in a pool of
strategies establishes a field of experimentation that filters out what is more useful under
what conditions. Among perceptive agents this makes learning possible, allowing
individuals to chose [sic.] the strategies they perceive as most useful. When many such
micro-level choices are similar, they create a macro-level trend that changes entire
societies...114
Building off the insights anthropologist Robert Boyd and biologist Peter J. Richerson offer in
their groundbreaking The Origin and Evolution of Cultures, Welzel and Inglehart go on to
explain that as viable life models which maximize an individual’s successful engagement and
mastery over their needs and opportunities are willfully adopted by others—and those that fail to
do so are deselected by their agents and ignored by others—the values which underpin those life
models are adopted as well.115 As individual agents continue to uptake successful maximization
strategies—or behaviors—and their corresponding values, the tide gains momentum and a largescale societal shift begins to emerge. This evolution, or social change, driven by the perceptive
determination and enactment of ‘maximizing’ values is not easily won, however. Individual
agents are inhibited from freely choosing ‘successful’ values and their congruent behaviors by a
variety of factors including social stratification, socialization, and normative pressures.116
Nevertheless, as certain value-inspired maximization strategies gain traction as better modes of
meeting needs and seizing opportunities, micro-level exertions of individual agency defy
inhibitive factors and snowball into societal evolution.
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It may already be obvious, then, how these notions of value and behavior fit into our
discussion of generations and social change. Values are “developed and internalized in patterned
ways” that include particular historical circumstance and significant Imprint Events—key
generational effects—but also social stratum, gender, race, etc.117 While values are not the sole
driving force for actions and generations are not the sole driving force for social change, they are
useful explanative conceptualizations for their respective end-results. Generations, constellations
of individuals who are themselves “constellations of values,” are endowed with specific
overarching value systems that reflect and construct their distinct consciousnesses; generational
members, then, tend to act harmoniously with their respective value system and participate in the
characteristic intellectual currents of society in more similar ways than not.118 In short: if values
influence behavior, behaviors scaffold and compound into broad societal trends, and generations
are distinguished by particular configurations of values, then generations influence social change
in particular ways.
A key, yet hitherto unmentioned, component of this intersectional framework deals with
the experimentation of values and their corresponding life models. Welzel and Inglehart wager
that this experimentation is likelier in younger people—younger generations—because the
sanctions for experimentation is less severe: “Having less of a lifetime invested into old values
and role models, they can more easily detach their identity from traditional patterns.”119 These
lifestyles, if proven a successful maximization within the given environmental conditions, could
then be diffused to and adopted by perceptive peers and amount to an eventual reconfiguration of
societal norms in the image of the young generation’s newly forged values or further esteemed
values already present in the social landscape. Once again, values and their related behaviors
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detail how generations contribute to the social order and how generation succession contributes
to the evolution and change of that social order.
The perspective that youth are the principal spearheads of social change is echoed by
Mannheim—he supposes that new impulses can only originate in new, young, organisms—as
well as by Ryder.120 Ryder offers empirical evidence to support his claim that change is
concentrated in younger cohorts, pointing to the active roles of youth in the Protestant
Reformation, the Civil Rights Movement, and in key historical revolutions in the West.121 He
incorporates the works of Levy, who credits transformative movements in China to younger
citizens, and Eisenstadt, who does the same for movements in Germany, to further illuminate the
impact youth have in societal evolution.122 Ryder rationalizes these historical observations with a
similar logic to that invoked by Welzel and Inglehart, affirming that as one ages, the penalties for
experimentation are heightened while the possibilities are reduced. This tendency means that
those firmly entrenched in the affairs and commitments of adulthood will uphold and continue
traditional patterns of thinking, fortifying continuity and resisting “comprehensive redefinition”
of societal norms.123 Ryder believes, then, that youth are the optimal agents of change because
they are not old enough to have been routinized into a stable value-behavior paradigm by
traditional institutions whereas they are old enough to critically challenge the “rigid precepts
implanted in childhood” and thus impel at least scenarios for change.124 Guided by their unique
generational Habitus, we can see how youth have the ability to assimilate and continue certain
norms they deem somewhat favorable or acceptable enough to not find objectionably
problematic, or to—as Sean Lyons and Lisa Kuron frame it—“rail against” the status quo in the
interest of some better maximization alternative and thus gradually push broad social change
along.125 Here is an apt time to stipulate that the social change, or social progress, referred to
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throughout these chapters is not necessarily a declaration that this change is ‘good’ or ‘desirable’
or an ‘improvement’ but merely that the conditions which constitute the social landscape have
undergone alterations. These aforementioned scholars substantiate a convincing argument that
generations act at the least as a force motivating social change.
Additional perspectives extend our understanding of the relationship of generation
succession and social change. Lauren Troska puts forth a useful model in her in her notion of
generational progression, which aims to discern how generational gaps represent social change.
She contends that emergent generations are brought into a progressed version of society that
older generations contributed to but did not grow up in, thereby preventing the older generation
from identifying with much of the challenges and experiences of the emergent generation.126 In
this view, we can see how Troska touches upon familiar tenets of generational theory,
particularly in agreeing that social change can reinforce and reflect distinct generational
identities because of the gaps social change produces in their parameters of experience. As such,
each generation gauges and engages in the progressive strides of the times with their baseline, or
the configuration of the society in the historical moment in which they grew up. Older
generations thus find the changes that youth generations inject into society—which moves
society further and further from their own baseline viewpoint—sometimes incomprehensible and
oftentimes undesirable; young generations view the changes and continuations older generations
make and have made in much of the same light.
This understanding of “experiential chasms” is supplemented by the esteemed economist
Walt W. Rostow’s account of the stages of societal growth.127 Hailing from Thomas Mann’s
novel Buddenbrooks—a sprawling chronicle of a wealthy family’s life across multiple
generations—Rostow poses the Buddenbrooks dynamic to hint at the incremental valuation
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change, and consequent action change, yielded by being born and brought up in certain
circumstances.128 The first generation of Buddenbrooks was born without money and thus placed
value on it, seeking and acquiring it; the second generation was born into financial security and
thus sought heightened social standing; the third generation, born into comfortable and
prestigious standing, instead placed value onto cultural expression and the arts. Viewing the
familial tale as a microcosm of broad social development, the Buddenbrooks dynamic
illuminates how each subsequent generation’s value and behavior systems can be affected by the
changes initiated and wrought by the generations prior. Flung into a new set of circumstances
arranged but not inherited by preceding generations, the succeeding crew of societal members
develop a shared Habitus that begins to inform the valuations they make and actions they take.
Simply, they build off the existing changes and initiate those of their own.

How Generations Drive the Social Process
To organize and connect the multi-faceted conceptualizations of social generation and its
relation to broadscale social change via generation succession, I make a refined synthesis below
foregrounding two essential elements of the ceaseless social process: generations are native to it
and vanguards within it.
Per our understanding of generation location, generations inherit a certain collection of
historical circumstances, cultural contexts, and social phenomena when they are born into a
particular cohort. These cohorts are situated in a parameter of experience which, as we know, is
fundamental in the creation of their distinct generational consciousness; each is native to these
inherited parameters of experience, or baselines. They experience these native items as inherent
realities, for they did not witness the gradual evolution of the circumstances or phenomena, but
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instead understand them as an essential part of everyday existence so much so that life predating
this native perception of society is borderline inconceivable. Traditional societal norms and
values get passed down to emergent generations as, again, native conditions of reality. Because
every cohort is plunged into different native configurations of society, the normative values—
those ingrained into children during socialization—and experimental values—those viable and
capable of being adopted with a greater or newfound vigor—that cohorts face are dissimilar. As
a young age-group coalesces into a unique generational identity through major historical and
cultural Imprint Events, they maximize their adaptation to their present conditions; this process
sees them uptaking favorable normative values, rejecting unfavorable normative values, and
breeding new values or new hierarchies of established values which become woven into their
generational identity. Generational members tend to operate from their shared native experiences
and generational consciousness in addition to the characteristics of their personal biographies—
which may be influenced by a variety of other social identities along racial, gendered, class
lines—so as to prioritize a set of congruent behaviors that compound into a societal-level force.
In this way, the emergent generation begins to vanguard.
Actualizing the components of a shared historical consciousness and sociocultural
Habitus, generations produce social action that either reinforces baseline circumstances or
rewrites them. Particular generation units, with their own specific manifestation of the distinct
generational identity to which they belong, tend to be the active social force responding to
stimuli within the social landscape in a particular manner. These changes or continuations—
incremental or fundamental—that an emergent generation vanguards—in cooperation or conflict
with other generations—through their subset generation units reaching entelechy alter the
historical make-up of society so that it is no longer configured in the native fashion that
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generation once knew but could not yet influence; since values and worldviews and imprints and
generational consciousnesses crystallize around youth experiences and remain mostly stable over
time, members are not detached from their native baselines once that sociohistorical reality no
longer exists. However, the changes they inject into the societal make-up, thus progressing the
social process, do get socialized into the next cohort as native circumstance. If the cohort
satisfies all the requirements of becoming a social generation, then from their native experience
they bear a fundamentally new, unseen perspective of the world that itself is truly a culmination
of alterations to the conditions of the social order that all previous generations pioneered. The
nascent generation is thus free and uniquely positioned to challenge, extend, undo, and adopt the
various socio-historical-cultural components that color its starting reality. In other words,
through uptaking these norms or through renouncing them, this generation participates within the
present configuration of the social process that yielded their peculiar identity. It transcends just
being created by social circumstance and now contributes to it by resisting and supporting and
dismantling and scaffolding. It becomes a generation as an actuality. It vanguards.
It does not do so alone, however, for contemporary generations may continue to vanguard
in keeping with their own native parameter of experience and their own peculiar generational
consciousness, stalling or accelerating the changes or continuities that the newly-actualized
generation begets. And the changes which it implements or fails to implement in accordance
with the distinct generational consciousness that unites and drives its generational members
register as the baseline conception of the world for the next generation, rendering the social
process progressed. And that next generation, cultivated by the unique web of circumstances
precipitated by antecedent vanguard generations and a key developmental determinant, forms its
own unprecedented generational identity which leads to particular actions and reactions within
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the social process, producing—vanguarding—changes which will create the native reality for
another later generation. This process repeats indefinitely, or so long as human fertility and
mortality persists. And that is the secret of history: generation succession is an eminent
contributor to the evolutionary process of society.
It may be helpful to ground this abstraction in real-world examples. Internet technology is
a relevant example for today’s youth generation, Gen Z. Born at a point in history where internet,
computers, cellphones, and even smartphones are commonplace, Generation Z has been
recognized as digital natives. Technology plays a veritable role in the reality of Gen Z’s
experience, marking their developmental years and thus weaving technological prowess and
familiarity into their generational identity and consciousness. But what of the prior generations
who vanguarded the baseline circumstances Gen Z faces? These generations that have affected
the social phenomenon of technology, whether by introducing change or securing continuity,
based on their generational consciousness? Informed by their characteristic identity, they indeed
have become a visible social force in societal evolution; no longer merely shaped by it, but
acting upon it. Baby Boomers offer a prime example. Cultivated in an industrial, analog,
prosperously innovative America—and so native to those aspects of history—Boomers helmed
and lived through crucial technological advances such as the most archaic forms of phones,
emails, and digital cameras. The cultural and social tremors of these technological developments
were felt every step of the way for Boomers, and their distinct attitudes, values, and ingrained
experiences informed the way they responded to these changes. It is empirically obvious in the
21st century’s third decade that high-tech development has far out-paced the comfort level of
Boomers but is second-hand for young Gen Zers. And as today's young generations trek on
through the life course and pioneer even greater technological innovations, they'll impart as
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native circumstance to their successor generations a keen comfort with significant advancements
in applied science—full adoption of electric, self-driving cars, hypersmart artificial intelligence,
integration of neurotechnology brain implants, and other leaps not yet imaginable—that
challenge their own highly adaptive sensibilities.129 The endless march of technological
progression, then, captures the way in which generations accept the baton at a unique vantage
point and carry it forward to the next hand-off, instilling into the new runners a wholly distinct
array of native technologies they'll come to outshine with their own innovations. More broadly,
the example shows that older generations do play direct roles in the changing of the time,
vanguarding the social process. Younger generations may inherit the changes in the social
process as their starting reality, as their native experience, or they may experience them as the
formative stimulus which births the beginnings of their common consciousness.
Additionally, the changes or contributions that vanguards can make in society are often
tethered to the native circumstances that bred their identity; based on the context of their
development, pilgrims could not have been expected to vanguard advancements in LGBTQ+
rights such as gay marriage. Yet incremental changes, subtle but valuable vanguarding, fronted
by dozens of generations led to the recent victory of gay marriage, which will now be woven into
future generations as a native circumstance. Building upon this native circumstance, those
generations will helm additional vanguarded gains for queer rights and acceptance. In a similar
fashion, one can hope but not reasonably expect that a generation whose native baseline is a
slave society to vanguard the essential protections of freedom and equality achieved in the Civil
Rights Movement. One can hope, but not reasonably expect, that a generation born within the
colonial arm of a mercantilist monarchy would champion sweeping voter rights for non-property
owners, non-white citizens, and women once they established their constitutional republic. One
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cannot reasonably expect a generation immediately predating the industrial revolution, thus
being without access to the science and empirical knowledge of the climate crisis, to vanguard a
full transition to sustainable, renewable energy sources. We can, of course, expect that from any
present-day generation, even if the intensity and frequency of climate disasters are not imprinted
onto their parameter of experience like they are for today’s batch of youth. This is the
unfortunate truth of social progression. It is a slow and painstaking journey toward better
civilization. Through generations, we are given a useful lens with which to study it.

Additional Generation Theories
More researchers add to this discussion of generation succession as a social force.
Abramson and Inglehart upholds generation replacement as a key explanatory factor in the
gradual shift from materialism to postmaterialism in a handful of European countries in the late
20th century.130 Charlotte Chorn Dunham further encapsulates the relationship between
generations and social action, finding that generational consciousness, especially among those
who explicitly identified with their own generation, was a strong predictor of activist tendencies
within the anti-war movement in the United States.131 Though focusing on kinship generations,
Gisela Trommsdorff discusses how change and continuity over time is influenced by cultural
transmission, which we can envision as the native norms and values embedded into generational
members’ childhoods.132 She posits a recursive, bidirectional model of transmission wherein
parents and offspring mediate each other's cultural values much in the same way that
contemporary social generations influence and test each other’s Habitus outlooks, a model which
Glen H. Elder solidified in his magnum opus Children of the Great Depression.133 Interestingly,
Trommsdorff recognizes that the model she describes is prone to deviation during the
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internalization process, much like that of mutations in organic biology. Reminiscent of the
popular push to analogize societal processes with biological stand-ins, it is apparent how the
mutations which take place in the cell (the individual) may ripple out into the whole of the
organism (the society). Ryder favors a different analogy which better signifies the relationship
between individuals and society in the social process without winnowing much of the
complexities: societies are like species, constituted by replaceable individuals capable of
independent mobility while still functioning within an evolutionary—baseline—imperative.134
Serving as a useful comparison for large-scale change via unit-level variety, society is indeed
more flexible in its type of change and faster in its rate of change than species because of the
cognitive agency humans have to uphold and disavow certain societal paradigms.
Not every scholar is convinced, however, that generations influence social change, or that
they are even a useful tool to examine social change. Harkening back to Alwin’s survey of
parental socialization in the Detroit area, his findings that cohort replacement influences did not
yield change in socialization values among non-Catholics contribute to a skepticism that cohort
replacement theory can be applied more broadly, even if the theory is refined with Mannheimian
social generations in place of cohorts.135 France and Roberts offer a similar perspective, one that
is not antagonistic toward generational theory but unconvinced by it.136 They’d prefer to look at
the factors which theorists claim cultivate generational identity—economic market forces,
political policies, historical developments—to study the macro processes underpinning social
change rather than diluting it through a separate, generational lens. Wilson and Banfield echo
this preference in their notion that collectivist values—and corresponding support for publicregarding policy—stem more from sociodemographic and socioeconomic factors.137 Thus, a
prime analytical pathway for social change for these researchers does not come in generational
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theory. For our purposes in this paper, however, I am inclined to disagree. An imperfect but
worthwhile construct, social generations offer a complex framework through which the indefinite
beginnings and ends of efforts at social change can be better understood
Other theories and models aim to explain societal phenomena without Mannheim’s
generational consciousness as a factor. A conflict theory approach posed by MacManus argues
age-effects rather than generational effects as a key determinant in behavior and perspective,
suggesting that older cohorts need more resources than do younger cohorts and thus they act in
ways that help to secure these resources.138 MacManus’ theory draws upon Bourdieu’s
conceptualizations of generation, wherein he sees it as a construct resulting from a “conflict over
economic and cultural resources and of the fact that different generations will see different
resources as important, leading to inter‐generational conflict.”139 Generational identities, then,
are born out of and preserved by the shared need to scrounge up access to “cultural capital and
material resources.”140 The conflict manifests in exclusionary practices—what Parkin calls
rituals of exclusion and Max Weber and Pierre Bourdieu coined as social closure—whereby
different cohorts attempt to restrict the access capacities of others so as to secure those
advantages primarily for themselves.141 Credentialism in the education field is a representation of
this sociological perspective of cohort conflict on a smaller scale: tenured officials resist the
transfer of resources to younger officials in an effort to retain power and relevancy, often
achieved through the emphasis of their superior credentials.142 These age-related tensions can
boil over into genuine conflict, for many revolutions pit youth and old age against each other.143
None of these theories gained quite as much traction as Strauss and Howe’s cyclical
model of generations, an intersection between the imprint and pulse-rate perspectives. Strauss
and Howe wager that their cyclical theory can “predict the style, attitudes, and behavior of each
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generation as it grows older” because every generation fits into one of four generational
personalities: idealist, reactive, civic, and adaptive.144 They argue first in their landmark
Generations: The History of America’s Future in 1991 and later in The Fourth Turning in 1996
that generational consciousnesses are not unique to every generation.145 Instead, the four
generational archetypes they prescribe recur every saeculum cycle, which lasts anywhere from
71 to 110 years and consists of four “turnings.”146 Each turning rings in a new generation’s
emergence, acting as the fundamental imprint which characterizes the identity that generation
will carry throughout its life course. The First Turning—High—sees strong institutions and
collectivism, much like the economic prosperity seen after World War II; the Second Turning—
Awakening—sees reclamation of personal autonomy and gradual rejection of institutions, much
like the Great Awakening in colonial times; the Third Turning—Unraveling—sees weakened
institutions and heightened individualism, much like the Prohibition of the ‘20s; the Fourth
Turning—Crisis—sees the destruction and reconstruction of institutional life and collectivist
sentiment reemerges, much like the twin crises of the Great Depression and World War II.147 It is
a more sophisticated version of the adage that has gained steam in recent years: “Hard times
create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. Weak men
create hard times.”
The archetypes, or generational personalities, are meant to denote the behavioral patterns
of each generation in respect to the turning in which they emerge. A new generation after a
Fourth Turning is a direct response to the previous, but in character and worldview they have
much more in common with the generation which came a full Saeculum before them. Their
notion that certain types of generational personalities are cultivated by certain historical
happenings is not unshared. Drawing upon Ronald Inglehart’s The Silent Revolution148
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delineation of social structures as insecure (wherein societies face social upheaval, war, or
economic instability) and secure (wherein societies are unburdened by such factors and
privileged by relative stability), Huan Chen argues that the mindset of a cohort will lean toward a
survivalist or hedonistic framework depending on the type of society they were oriented to
during their adolescence.149 In other words, a generational identity is congealed around and
programmed by the broad strokes of society’s circumstances without must respect to the specific
characteristics of those circumstances; whether the ‘insecurity’ in the social structure is mass
protest or crippling recession, the result is a generational mindset centered on enduring hardship
rather than enjoying leisure.
The parallel is clear: insecure social structures represent a Crisis Turning whereas secure
social structures represent an Awakening Turning. Strauss and Howe introduce intervening
turnings to mark the transitions between these structures, and for these turnings they subscribe to
a variable periodicity of about 20 years wherein members of a generation are fixed to that
corresponding mindset. These mindsets—generation archetypes—trickle down into the attitudes
the generation carries and the behaviors the generation carries out.150 In this way, we can see that
the Strauss and Howe model holds as Mannheim’s conceptualization of social generation does
that generations are a social force propelling the continuous turn of the wheel of history.
Of course, the theory is flawed. They incorporate imprint principles into a pulse-rate
framework, applying to large swathes of history semi-concrete boundaries that divide the cohorts
and immediately graduate them to social generations because they inherently must satisfy one of
the archetypes. Though the notion of assigning a specific archetype to each cohort has not taken
root, Strauss and Howe’s perspective that each cohort does in fact translate to a social generation
is an idea that has been adopted. It is important to note that the possibility for any cohort to
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evolve into an actual generation is undoubtedly there, but the mere fact that a cohort must follow
Millennials does not guarantee that a true generation will spring forth from that next cohort. The
cohort of Gen Z might indeed make for an emerging social generation, but contrary to Strauss
and Howe’s rigid succession of specific generational archetypes, its crystallization is not
inevitable. Further, their retrospective identification of turnings within a flexible saeculum cycle
amounts to a model which can be fitted to account for every possible aberration, allowing there
to be some generations which perfectly align with the popular 30-year paradigm while others fall
12 years short. And when historical circumstances run so counter to the pattern established by
the saeculum cycle, as the Civil War crisis did, the model is able to account for the exception by
skipping over an entire “civic” generation.151
Now, Strauss and Howe are certainly not the first to identify cyclical undercurrents to
broad historical trends, for they explicitly draw upon some thinkers such as Anthony Wallace,152
Nikolai Kondratiev,153 Walter Dean Burnham,154 and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.155 who have posited
cyclicality with cultural revitalization movements, capitalist economies, political party
ideologies, and national moods of political ideology, respectively. Most paramount among them,
the unparalleled political scientist Samuel P. Huntington espoused in his 1983 book American
Politics: The Promise of Disharmony the existence of a fairly regular calendar of “creedal
passions” that spawn realignment of dominant political institutions with core American ideals;
Huntington points to the Revolutionary era of the 1770s, the Jacksonian era of the 1830s, the
Progressive era of the 1900s, and the Civil Rights era of the 1960s as evidence of these recurrent
idealistic eruptions of the people.156 What sets Strauss and Howe apart from these other
gentlemen is that the pattern they observe across nearly 6 centuries of Anglo-American history is
an all-encompassing explication of our society’s history, framing its progression in circular
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strides much like a coil spring. It is an admirably ambitious venture, but their vision of a
repeating cycle of fixed archetypes in a semi-flexible timeframe has its critics. Author and
American political historian Michael Lind lambasts the cyclical-generational model as
pseudoscience, writing: “The key to history, it appears, is the Fudge Factor.”157 Hart-Brinson
laments that the legacy of the Strauss-Howe model has cemented the mainstream notion that the
Gen X and Millennial cohorts are generations, which he believes to be “almost purely social
fiction.”158 And as for that sentiment about hard times and strong men, ancient historian Bret
Devereaux intricately describes how the realities of civilization are not so wonderfully
succinct.159
There’s always an unfortunate degree of losing the finer intricacies of the historical
process when undergoing the necessary effort to reduce that process into manageable
components that permit sociological analysis, but the account Strauss and Howe offer might
expend a little too much nuance for any conclusions drawn upon it to be tenable. Therefore,
while this model provides a useful combination of key facets of other generational theories and
tenets, Mannheim’s conceptualization of social generation and the revised considerations of
generation succession as a mode of explaining the social process better respond to the research
questions presented in this paper. Nevertheless, I will give these foremost theorists the last word:
“Just as history produces generations, so too do generations produce history.”160 Indeed.

55

Conclusion

A fitting overview of the concept of generation is as follows: “a generation is not only a united
group, born in a certain period, but also a common attitude, a response emerging from
spontaneous impulses...a common collective mental, emotional and physical development.”161
Further, social generation is at once a crossroads of historical circumstance, cultural mood, and
individual experience within a society.
A generation location is the most basic requisite for a social generation’s formation; it
combines cohort with nation, making it so that two individuals must be born at a certain point in
the historical timeline and on the same side of a set of borders which contains a national culture
if they are to be considered a part of the same generation location. Endowed with this generation
location, individuals of like age and like national culture have a common parameter of
experience. The configuration of society into which these individuals are born—their baseline
reality—is distinct from the configuration into which individuals of other generation locations
enter. Further, major historical events and significant cultural phenomena constitute imprints on
adolescent individuals’ parameter of experience. While members of other generation locations
may have also experienced those events or interacted with those phenomena, it is not an imprint
for them because it did not occur during their formative years. imprints can bestow upon
members of a generation location, by virtue of bringing them vividly into a collective parameter
of experience of societal conditions, the potential for a shared set of attitudes and perspectives—
a Habitus—which would mostly endure throughout their lifetime.
The evolution from generation location to generation as an actuality comes through the
consistent and meaningful interaction of coming-of-age individuals with the cultural and social
effects of their parameter of experience—including and especially the circumstances arising
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from the crystallizing agents that are imprints. As members come of age and interact with their
social landscape in such a way, the mixture of values, behaviors, and beliefs passed down to
them by society and the Habitus informed by unique Imprint Events of their youth cement into a
generational consciousness, the defining feature of a true social generation. Not everyone who
belongs to the generation location will necessarily make this leap to become a part of the actual
generation. If an adolescent were isolated from much or all of the impacts of WWII because
they, for example, worked on a remote subsistence farm in rural America, then that individual
might not develop a generational consciousness with his peers who were impacted by WWII in
some intellectual, physical, or cultural aspects. Further, not everyone in an actual generation will
necessarily have the same relationship to the formative imprints of their parameter of experience
nor will they respond to them in the exact same way as the rest of their peers. For instance, a
draft dodger and a soldier of the same actual generation have distinct sorts of experiences with
the Vietnam War, but that event constitutes for both of them a significant aspect of their
parameters of experience and both of them directly interacted with that formative circumstance.
They might have disparate attitudes on the event—one seemingly in favor and one against—but
it still operates as a distinctive, binding historical condition for them both; while still in the same
social generation, they belong to different generation units.
Generations are social forces which drive societal change. United in a common
generational consciousness, or generational identity, distinct from those of past or future social
generations, a generation’s interaction with their circumstances is specific to them. Individuals
will typically act and operate in accordance with their Habitus, so they may reject societal norms
or adopt new behavior patterns in a manner that is in part informed by their generational
consciousness. These rejections and adoptions may be small-scale or massive, but they constitute
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incremental social changes. Emergent generations, because they are less likely to be fully
socialized into predominant values and customs and thus more willing to experiment, are
especially likely to drive social change. When generational members, typically springing from a
specific generation unit, overtly make an effort to make societal changes, they become
vanguards; the changes they seek to make are often informed by their generational
consciousness, and so generations leave an impression on the stream of history that is distinct.
Whatever changes a generation successfully vanguards help to define the parameter of
experience for the next cohort, or generation location. If substantial imprints help to create a
collective identity which individuals reinforce through interaction with their conditions, then a
new social generation emerges. And in alignment with its own distinctive consciousness, that
generation will affect change in the historical process. These fully-fledged generations would
coexist in contemporaneity, but due to their distinctive features, they interpret and respond to
contemporaneous sociohistorical stimuli in different ways.162 Their responses—which may
overlap and align in certain instances, but usually it is the younger generation which spearheads
the most radical front—further impress changes onto the social landscape, influencing the native
conditions of the forthcoming cohort and perhaps facilitating the imprints which may elevate that
cohort to a social generation distinguished by its own developing generational consciousness.
The process repeats indefinitely so long as societies exist and social beings exist within them.
A major limitation of this piece is the abstract nature in which generations were treated.
While Gen Z was utilized a springboard for this discussion of generation theory and some realworld examples were integrated, this thesis fails to examine whether Gen Z or any of the other
present-day cohorts (e.g., Boomers) satisfy the refined conceptualization of social generation
offered in my piece. Additionally, there was no comparison between the application of
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Mannheimian social generations and other generational theories (such as the cyclical model
posed by Strauss and Howe) in order to determine which conceptualization is most useful in
describing the relationship between generations and the social process. An in-depth analysis of
each generation’s prevailing identity (characteristics the generation had) and legacy (influence
the generation had with the major events or trends of their time) would help bear out whether
these concepts of social generation are indeed truly useful. Further, additional avenues for
research could include applying the different generational theories to a particular cohort in order
to examine what overlaps and distinctions there are and if there happen to be advantages one
framework offers that the others fail to do so. These theories could also retroactively be applied
to past generations in order to determine if and to what extent an individual born in 1880 was a
part of a social generation much in the same way someone born in 1980 is considered to be.
As a final note before we end things, I want to clarify that this thesis is one component of
a larger research project I have been conducting the past two years. In the forthcoming 5-part
paper which shares that research in full, I do touch on some of the additional avenues for
research. With this thesis as the foundation for what generations are and how they can act as a
social force, I make an effort to determine if Gen Z is indeed a social generation, if a major
imprint for that generation is indeed climate change, and if certain pathways of their engagement
with that circumstance might be sufficient enough to influence the social process. Further, I
describe the generational identities of the present generations, including Gen Z, as they have
been portrayed in both scholarly studies and pop culture commentary. Ultimately, I hone in on
how generational harmony between Gen Z and its predecessors might be achieved and why it is
likely necessary to ensure that their climate-oriented youth activism will be effective in
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mitigating the climate crisis. It is in that paper that the fundamental ideas of this thesis are
realized.
Social generations rise up out of monumental changes in society, and they in turn
produce new changes in society. Generation succession fuels history. Knowing generations can
help us to know history better. The prize of that is the chance to create better history.
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